

# What happens when we have advanced Al systems?

- We are on a path to Al Systems that will outperform most humans at most cognitive tasks by the end of the decade
- What does this mean for all the humans?

#### Al Safety, the opposing viewpoints

There will be no issues

Al will kill us all

A secret third thing

#### **Value Alignment**



Many definitions



Simplest one (paraphrased): actions that an agent performs in a state are measurably close to those a human holding certain values would perform

Why is alignment hard?

#### Ideal Specification: wishes of designer

Whose values are you aligning to? Does the designer have the best interests in mind of everyone?



Design Specification: reward function

How comprehensive was the defined reward?



Revealed Specification: system's behavior after optimizing for said reward

#### **Societal Impacts**



Where is AI being used? Who is it affecting?





What are the values of the designer?



This is where public policy, study of AI ethics, governance goes

Model responses are most similar to the opinion distributions of the USA and Canada, some of the European and South American countries.





Durmus et al. Towards Measuring the Representation of Subjective Global Opinions in Language Models. 2023. Why is alignment hard?

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


Revealed Specification: system's behavior after optimizing for said reward

#### How to define a reward function?

- Very hard to explicitly specify every possible thing
- Try to learn the implicit rules for a reward via preference learning

How to side step hard problems





# Hidden Motivations and Implications for Al Alignment

- Another issue is that a user may not be privy to the defined motivations (rewards) of an Al Agent but Agent knows all about you
- E.g. Character Al style chatbots optimized for engagement via feedback, hidden system prompts, etc.
- Asymmetric information makes it difficult for human to ensure
  Al is doing what they want

### Now what?

How to mitigate and fix these holes?

#### **Oversight**



Informed: A human looks at all outputs an Al produces and can verify all the reasons for producing them.

Aka "faithful explainability" from the NLP world



Amplified: The model behaves in such a way to increase a human's ability to verify their outputs.



Scalable: The overall problem of being able to supervise highly capable systems at high throughputs.

# Informed Oversight

This is the HF part of RLHF

Human experts sit down and supervise models via feedback for RL rewards or SFT

Most frontier models still rely heavily on this

# Amplified Oversight

Key issue: Eventually AI will be at the stage that we don't know enough to verify it

Current research in the area tries to mimic this asymmetry using weaker/stronger models

What can the model do to improve a human's ability to verify?

 Example approach: model generates a self-critique that the human can more easily understand. Explainability / rationale generation belong to this category

## Scalable Oversight

Many definitions but key difference is that maybe you can't trust the model to provide faithful critiques anymore

**Model sycophancy**: you've RLHF'd the model so hard it only says things you want to hear

"Scheming": model's specified goals do not align with your ideal goals but still pretends to in order to keep optimizing

#### **Oversight via Critiques and Debate**



What can the model do to improve a human's ability to verify?

Example approach: model generates a self-critique that the human can more easily understand. Explainability / rationale generation belong to this category



But what if the critiques are also too hard for humans to understand?


Train the AI to self-play via debate: human provides rewards to the most useful trajectories in the generated debates

### Mechanistic(?) Interpretability 1

 Forcing agents to communicate via human readable plans. i.e. latent space reasoning is not great from a safety perspective


### Mechanistic(?) Interpretability 2


Attention: can be
 ~interpreted but
 perhaps not quite so
 explainable




### Mechanistic(?) Interpretability 3

 Sparse Autoencoders – forcing sparsity in learning activations makes things more interpretable





#### **Mechanistic Interpretability 4 - Circuits**



#### Safe RL

 (One formulation) Maximize discounted rewards (returns) while keeping discounted costs below a certain threshold

$$\max_{\pi} \ J_R(\pi) \doteq \underset{\tau \sim \pi}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(s_t, a_t) \right] \quad \text{s.t.} \ J_C(\pi) \doteq \underset{\tau \sim \pi}{\mathbb{E}} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t C(s_t, a_t, x) \right] \leq h_C(x),$$

 Very important esp in robotics where there are very real hardware costs to messing up an action

#### The Necessity of a Human in the Loop



Preserve human agency by attempting to reward systems for seeking out human oversight



Discourage fully autonomous AI systems that do not require assistance or oversight

#### **LLM Security**


#### Natural language attack surfaces

Jailbreaks are likely unfixable via current techniques

Bad actors can make model do things it wasn't designed for

Does this matter? If so why?

Agents are only as unsafe as the access you give them



Fu et al. Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use. 2024.

### Capability Tradeoffs and Economic Incentives



Most of these methods tradeoff some capabilities of the agents in return for better safety properties

Economic incentives will usually push for higher levels of autonomy for agents, lower costs, etc



Govt policy and human design choices are critical to curbing this

### Thank you

https://pearls-lab.github.io/ai-agents-course/lectures.html



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